Given the current AUV coverage rate, deployment of multiple sophisticated software that enables them to perceive, reason vehicle formations will be required. Since the ocean is a about, and adapt to their environment. As such, they are a type dynamic, unpredictable environment where all relevant events of agent, understood by Al researchers to be a software cannot be anticipated, AUVs in the formation will need to program designed to autonomously perform similar tasks. handle problems cooperatively during the mission; otherwise, Agent researchers recognize that achieving some tasks requires time will be wasted in covering missed areas.
As we have argued, communication failure among AUVs policies for this protocol [5] . Conversation policy violations will be common, due to acoustic properties of the water, low are a type of communication error that must be identified and bandwidth, and complexity of the communication systems. resolved by communicating agents. Protocol violations may be The problems of underwater communication have been well a result of lower level errors in communication. For example, documented, but little has been done to examine how the an agent may induce a protocol violation by failing to communication problems combine with the complexities of understand a message or by failing to process an already cooperative behavior to affect the overall goal of complete erroneous message; to further the problem, the protocol coverage. We propose using a DFMEA in the communication violation may not be immediately identifiable but may design process to account for failure and its effect on overall propogate further error. system goals. DFMEA is a tool used to analyze failure in a system and plan a design response to that failure, on the C. AUVACLs assumption that system failure is the result of regular causal One language representative of the effort to create a processes that can be identified and avoided. It also gives us a common language for cooperating AUVs is COLA [6] . method for documenting failures in the system and the actions Developers of COLA recognize that high error rates are taken to deal with them. characteristic of AUV communication, given the unreliability DFMEA enables a design team to take a snapshot of the of underwater communication and significant limitations on design process for a particular system. They can use this to bandwidth and available resources for message processing. In record what has been done, what is and is not working, and [6] , the developers of COLA note that the possibility of a where they must go if they are to achieve their design goals. message containing an error must be considered while The tool is applied iteratively at various points in the process to designing a language for AUV designed system (i.e., the "item," with its associated Some errors will not be induced in the form of the message but "function") and then distinguishing the different ways or will be more conceptual; thus, AUVs must recognize defective modes in which it can fail. These are further distinguished in messages with proper syntax. Given this, more robust error terms of specific causes and effects that can give rise to these detection must be introduced. Once a message has been modes, along with associated occurrence and severity ratings.
determined to have a legal syntactic structure, the AWV must Those columns associated with failure response include "Current Design Controls," "Recommended Actions," and "Action Results." After identifying specific instances of 1) Item and Function. The communication system to be failure, the design team lists the current design controls along designed will support information exchange between AUVs. with detection ratings. The Risk Assessment Number (RPN) is Following [11] and [12] , we model this as signal propagation calculated by multiplying the three rating together. This rating from a sender through a transmission channel to a receiver. determines which cause/effect failure pairs are most critical. Fig. 1 presents our model. We presume that each item operates Recommended actions are rated when implemented to as a module, and that we can assess the system for failure in a determine if they adequately reduce the RPN. The final column modular way, looking at each in turn independently of the records the actions taken and their effects on the ratings. More others. information is added to the DFMEA table as design proceeds and more information is known [7] . sender Transm sos Recever B. Our Approach Design processes are essentially goal oriented. Application [8] .) The teleological, or presumption with the square bracket. Our analysis of sender means/end, approach involves creating a DFMEA that is failure will be conducted at S1, looking back on the processes explicitly keyed to the final goal of the design process. in the sender that should function to produce the appropriate Knowledge of the specifications associated with eventual message. We indicate this with the round bracket. system success can be used to identify failure types that must AUVs communicate with one another via acoustic be avoided along the way. This "ends determine the means" modem, and so the transmission channel will typically be approach treats each design stage relationally as a means to the water; however, AUVs may also need to surface and end product under development, and so the item/function and communicate with the fleet via radio connection. In Fig. 1 The receiver is an AUV tasked with the job of receiving design team moves to the logic and agent theory, the DFMEA and interpreting the message. We represent the receiver as the would be recast to fit this stage, focusing on different items and segment from S2 to S3, and assume that the signal has arrived modes of failure. A teleological approach, by contrast, would at the sensors at S2 intact and error-free. We assess at S3, install items and modes of failure determined by the nature of looking for failures introduced in reception and interpretation. the system to be developed, and these would shape failure identification and response throughout the design process.
2) Modes. A failure mode is a form or type of system We adopt the teleological approach in this paper, for two failure. This part of the DFMEA serves to classify broad types reasons. First, the nature of the communication required for of system failure. Failure modes are further analyzed into successful AUV interaction is fairly well-known, at least in associated causes and effects in the next two columns. These broad outline, and our goal is to design a system realizing modes can be individuated in a variety of ways, but here our communication of this sort [9] . Second, much is known about teleological approach inclines us to identify stable and communication failure in the psychological and linguistic systemic ways of identifying failure types. Given this literature, and by organizing the DFMEA in this fashion, we approach, the modes should be determined by the character of can borrow insights from those fields [10] . The failures that successful intervehicle communication and remain the same most concern us are those that would directly impact eventual throughout the many iterations that might occur in the design system success, and so we use our antecedent knowledge of process. The identified modes should reflect a way of that success to guide identification and response to failure.
examining signal propagation and manipulation from the perspective of overall design success. C. The Structure ofthe DFMEA If successful, the communication system will support As noted above, the DFMEA is a table with columns propagation of a signal from sender through transmission devoted to aspects of failure identification and failure response. channel to receiver. We adopt the point of view of the signal as We now detail our treatment ofthese in turn.
it propagates through the three functional stages. which the item/function in question can fail. We know of is failing to send a message that should be sent, or perhaps it is failure through its effects. Were part of the system to fail (i.e., sending the wrong message. A failure will be described in were it to stop functioning as it was designed) without terms of its associated mode, and so described, is independent discernible effects, either direct or indirect, then we would of the three-part distinction used to classify causes.
have no evidence of that failure and no reason to be concerned
We begin our search for causes at the intentional level.
about it. It would be innocuous and would go unnoticed and Here the causes are described in intentional terms, e.g., untreated. Thus, we first look for effects associated with our 'belief^, 'desire', 'intention', 'goal', 'plan', etc. If the cause can failure modes at each of our evaluation points and then look be described in this way, the remedy will be straightforward back to the item under examination for causes of those effects. and will not require software or hardware repair. This level of analysis will be available for sender and receiver but not for its way out in the wash." Alternatively, we might reject the the transmission channel. Given the SI effects from the assumption of modularity above and embrace the possibility previous paragraph, we would investigate whether our sending that the effect really emerges from a combination of causes AUV can be credited with mistaken "beliefs" about the time of located in more than one item in the system. Thus, there could its turn to communicate or the physical situation it is in that be causal influence that "builds" through S1and the effects of failure at the intentional level and then pursue Minimally, the action might be to stand pat, if the failure does causes for those effects through the three levels. Our not threaten overall system function and it is more cost investigation begins at the intentional level, which corresponds effective to marginalize it than repair it. In most situations, with our initial engagement with the sender at SI. though, the actions will be more aggressive. These will be distributed across the three causal dimensions. The current If we are unable to identify a cause at the intentional level, software/hardware configuration might enable us to respond we move to the software level and examine whether the cause intentionally to the failure, modifying the state of the system is located in the code or the logic of our agents. As with the sufficiently to avoid future failure. For example, a vehicle's intentional level, this level will in general be unavailable when memory might become incorrect during the mission due to a dealing with the transmission channel. Returning to our missed communication. An intentional fix would be to have the sending agent, is it failing to transmit because of a bug in its AUV leader correct the vehicle's memory during its next code? Perhaps there is an interaction effect in the various broadcast. Here we would use existing controls to immunize system logics that has interfered with transmission. In general, the system against future failures of this type. Occasionally, remedies of causes at this level, such as repairing code, will be though, we will need to act at the software or hardware levels more invasive than repairs at the intentional level but less to address the failure. At those levels, an attempt is made to invasive than hardware repair. (See the pair E2/C2 in Fig. 2.) prevent the cause of the failure by making changes to the Finally, if we are still unsuccessful in our search for the vehicle. For example, the logic may be designed incorrectly, cause, we move to the hardware level, i.e., the level of the causing persistent inaccuracies in memory that take too many physical systems that implement code and support formation resources to correct. Failures of this sort would communication. This level is available for all items. With require alterations on the software level. Alternatively, the respect to our sample failures, there may be a problem with the problem may be rooted in the hardware a sensor may be modem, or with the hardware that implements the malfunctioning or perhaps the AUV lacks a sensor needed to communication software. As repairs at this level are time-keep the memory current. intensive and costly, it is best to avoid them if at all possible;
The final column is reserved for what results from the however, there will be occasions when we have no choice. recommended actions. The first sub-column in this part of the (See the pair C3/E3 in Fig. 2.) DFMEA records the action taken in response to the identified
We have illustrated the search for causes at SI, but the failure. The remaining sub-columns record the impact this same methods hold true at the later evaluation points, action is taken to have on the ratings that measure the severity, depending on the availability of the levels of analysis. If the occurrence potential, detectability, and RPN, or overall impact search for the cause is repeatedly unsuccessful at any level, on the system. To these measures we now turn. then we are left with two options. First, we might bracket the failure and press ahead in the hope that the failure will "work D. Ratings corrected by the formation, although this is mitigated if the We have tailored the occurrence, severity, detection, and failure can be communicated to the ship. If the AUVs can risk assessment number ratings to the task of underwater MCM detect the failure but not communicate with the ship, the failure with cooperating AUVs. The occurrence rating measures the would earn a Medium rating. The rating is High if the failure frequency of failure causes see Table II . The occurrences are can only be detected during analyis of the data after the much higher than a normal DFMEA because the same mission, and Very High if the failure would never be detected. communication error can happen several times throughout the same mission. Based on our work involving the replacement of In a typical DFMEA, the detection rating measures the formation-to-fleet communication. ability of the system, using current design controls, to (a)
The "Sends When Should but Wrong" mode has a very detect failure before it occurs, or (b) control the effects of high RPN. In the current simulations it is easy for a vehicle's failure. Our detection rating, listed in Table IV , is different memory to become incorrect, causing it to send an incorrect than a typical detection rating because it is difficult to detect message. This can cause gaps in the search pattern, which gets failure in the communication system before it occurs. the highest severity rating because it is associated with missed Consistent with our teleological approach, the ratings are mines that could result in loss of equipment or personnel. In determined from the perspective of the system as it performs a addition the vehicles currently have no method of determining mission; in particular, they are determined by the timing of what cells have been scanned, and if a vehicle is lost, the failure detection, since the sooner it is detected, the sooner it personnel on the ship will have no way of determining exactly can be corrected. Timing is important when the goal is to what cells had been covered. The initial part of our solution to achieve complete coverage of an area. The rating is lowest if this problem is to have each ofthe AUVs in the formation keep the formation can detect the failure and correct it during the a coverage map that tracks missed cells [14] . This reduces the mission. It increases if the failure can be detected but not RPN from 100 to 60. The next step is to have the formation redirect vehicles to cover the missed areas. 
